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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : 
v. : 
STEVEN J. PYEATT, : Case No. 880274-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Appellant/Petitioner. : 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a petition for rehearing of a decision filed by 
this Court on April 20, 1989. Originally, this case was an appeal 
from judgment and conviction for Unlawful Possession of a Controlled 
Substance with Intent to Distribute, a second degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (Supp. 1988); 
Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance, to wit: Marijuana, a 
class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1988); and Unlawful Possession of 
Paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§58-37a-5(l) (1986), in the Third Judicial District Court in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup, 
Judge, presiding. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The facts are set forth in Appellant's opening brief at 
1-6. 
INTRODUCTION 
This petition for rehearing is filed pursuant to Rule 35 
Utah Rules of the Court of Appeals. In Brown v. Pickard, denying 
rehfg, 11 P. 512 (Utah 1886), the Utah Supreme Court established th 
standard for granting a petition for rehearing, stating: 
To justify a rehearing, a strong case must be 
made. We must be convinced that the court failed 
to consider some material point in the case, or 
that it erred in its conclusions . . . . 
11 P. at 512. Later, in Cummings v. Nielson, 129 P. 619 (1913), 
this Court added: 
To make an application for a rehearing is a matter 
of right, and we have no desire to discourage the 
practice of filing petitions for rehearings in 
proper cases. When this court, however, has 
considered and decided all of the material 
questions involved in a case, a rehearing should 
not be applied for, unless we have misconstrued or 
overlooked some statute or decision which may 
affect the result, or that we have based the 
decision on some wrong principle of law, or have 
either misapplied or overlooked something which 
materially affects the result . . . If there are 
some reasons, however, such as we have indicated 
above, or other good reasons, a petition for a 
rehearing should be promptly filed and, if it is 
meritorious, its form will in no case be 
scrutinized by this court. 
Cummings, 129 P. at 624. The argument section of this brief will 
establish that, applying these standards, this petition for 
rehearing is properly before the Court and should be granted. In 
its opinion in State v. Pyeatt, Case No. 880274-CA, slip op. (filed 
April 20, 1989) (attached as Addendum A ) , this Court overlooked 
relevant case law and misconstrued and misapplied the facts and law 
applicable to this case. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The affidavit failed to state sufficient facts to 
establish probable cause on its face. This Court's reliance on 
State v. Hadd, 619 P.2d 1047 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980) is misplaced 
since the facts of Hadd are distinguishable. 
Officer Droubay intentionally or recklessly made material 
misrepresentations in the affidavit. Absent those 
misrepresentations, the affidavit fails to establish probable cause. 
Rationale and precedent support Mr. Pyeatt's arguments 
under the state constitution and require that this Court address the 
state constitutional issues raised in this case. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT. THIS COURT MISCONSTRUED THE FACTS AND 
MISAPPLIED THE LAW WHEN IT UPHELD THE SEARCH 
WARRANT. 
A. THE AFFIDAVIT WAS FACIALLY DEFICIENT. 
In its decision, this Court focused primarily on 
Appellant's argument that the affidavit on its face failed to state 
sufficient facts for a finding of probable cause. Pyeatt, slip op. 
at 1-4. This Court relies on State v. Hadd, 619 P.2d 1047 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 1980), in reaching its decision that probable cause existed 
on the face of the affidavit. However, the facts in Hadd are 
distinguishable from those in the instant case. 
In Hadd, undercover officers drove a confidential 
informant to the apartment of a known drug dealer. A surveillance 
unit followed the dealer to the Appellant's apartment, then back to 
the dealer's apartment where the dealer gave a small bag of 
marijuana to the CI and the agents. The dealer then offered to sell 
the agents an additional half pound of marijuana. The surveillance 
unit thereafter watched the dealer make a telephone call and drive 
to Appellant's apartment. After the dealer returned to his 
apartment, officers arrested him and found a package of marijuana in 
his vehicle. The officers then immediately obtained a telephonic 
search warrant for Appellant's apartment. 
In the present case, the connection between Mr. Pyeatt's 
home and the transaction which occurred at the Atherton address is 
more attenuated than the connection between the Appellant's home and 
the transaction in Hadd. Several people were at the Atherton 
address who could have supplied the drugs to the CI. The two 
transactions took place several days apart and the search warrant 
was obtained several days after the second transaction. In Hadd, 
the dealer went to the Appellant's apartment twice in one evening, 
the second time being immediately after offering a "sample" to the 
officers. 
The "totality of the circumstances" in this case did not 
give rise to a reasonable belief that the officers would find 
controlled substances in the Montgomery duplex. Mr. Pyeatt 
respectfully requests that this Court reconsider its decision on 
this issue. 
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B. MATERIAL MISREPRESENTATIONS AND OMISSIONS 
INVALIDATED THE SEARCH WARRANT UNDER THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION. 
In its decision, this Court briefly addressed the issue 
of whether the material misrepresentations and omissions invalidated 
the search warrant under the federal constitution. Slip op. at 2 
(n.2), 3. While this Court acknowledges that the statement on that 
affidavit that two controlled buys occurred at the Montgomery 
address was "technically inaccurate," it does not discuss the 
"inaccuracies" regarding whether the "dealer" or some unknown third 
person was followed to the Montgomery address. 
As set forth in Appellant's Reply Brief at 14-17, during 
the first sixteen pages of his testimony, Officer Droubay clearly 
and unequivocally testified that a third person other than the 
dealer drove to the Montgomery address. After Officer Droubay read 
the affidavit, his testimony altered and he suggested that "Randy," 
the dealer who did business with the CI, was the same person who 
drove to the Montgomery address. Hence, Officer Droubay 
significantly misrepresented the facts while under oath—either in 
the affidavit or in the first several minutes of his testimony. 
This Court fails to address those significant misrepresentations in 
its opinion. 
In addition, this Court determined that the trial judge's 
finding that the misrepresentations were not made in bad faith was 
not clearly erroneous and that "defendant has not presented any 
compelling evidence that Droubay1s somewhat inaccurate and 
incomplete statements were made knowingly, intentionally, or 
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recklessly." Slip op. at 4. The statement fails to consider the 
statement in State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188 (Utah 1986) that a law 
enforcement officer is aware of the need for accuracy and 
truthfulness in preparing an affidavit and that such awareness 
should be taken into account when determining whether the officer 
had the requisite intent when he included the falsehood. 
Furthermore, it fails to consider the misleading nature of Droubay's 
testimony and the abrupt change in testimony after the officer read 
the affidavit and was reminded of the discrepancies between the 
affidavit and his testimony. 
Both this Court and the Utah Supreme Court have 
acknowledged that this officer acted with "confusion, oversight or 
ineptitude" (slip op. at 4) or "erred in judgment" (State v. 
Colonna, 766 P.2d 1062, 1065 (Utah 1988)),1 but neither court has 
been willing to scrutinize the convictions obtained as the result of 
this officer's inappropriate actions. An officer who misrepresents 
the truth under oath is not likely to later acknowledge those 
untruths, leaving a defendant with nothing other than circumstantial 
evidence to establish the requisite intent. At the very least, this 
officer was reckless in including false statements as to the 
location of bhe "controlled buys" and the identity of the person who 
1 In Colonna, the Supreme Court acknowledged that 
"defendant's criticisms of Droubay's behavior are justified 
[footnote omitted]," but held that "the officer's conduct was not so 
outrageous as to shock the conscience, nor was it fundamentally 
repugnant to the American criminal justice system [citation 
omitted]." 766 P.2d at 1065. 
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drove to the Montgomery address. A complete review of Officer 
Droubay's testimony establishes that he had the requisite interest 
in this case. 
This Court further stated that it was "not convinced that 
any of the statements defendant claims are false or wrongfully 
omitted would be material to a determination of probable cause 
[citation omitted]." Slip op. at 4. Contrary to this Court's 
reasoning, if the person followed to the Montgomery address was in 
no way linked to the buys at the Atherton address or the dealer at 
that address, which appears to be the case based on the first 
sixteen pages of Officer Droubay's testimony, there is no probable 
cause to search the Montgomery address once the false statements are 
excised. 
Mr. Pyeatt respectfully requests that this Court 
reconsider this issue and find that Officer Droubay intentionally or 
recklessly included material misrepresentations in or excluded 
material information from the affidavit. 
C. RATIONALE AND PRECEDENT SUPPORT THE STATE 
CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT. 
In its opinion, this Court did not analyze Mr. Pyeatt's 
argument that Article I, §14 of the state constitution was violated 
in this case, and instead stated simply: 
Because we find no precedent or rationale 
compelling a different result under our state 
constitution, we do not address this issue. 
Slip op. at 4-5. 
Contrary to this Court's assertion, case law and 
rationale supporting a separate analysis exist in this case. 
Appellant's argument under the state constitution was 
that our constitution offers greater protection in a search and 
seizure context than does its federal counterpart. Historically, 
such an argument makes sense since, at the time the Utah 
Constitution was adopted, the State had recently outlawed polygamy 
and federal troops were stationed in Utah to control activities. 
Citizens of Utah, many of whom were practicing polygamy despite the 
change in the law, had an interest in greater protections from 
intrusions into their homes. Hence, history provides a rationale 
for finding a greater protection under Article I, §14 of the Utah 
Constitution than under the. fourth amendment to the federal 
constitution. 
Furthermore, Utah case law explicitly suggests the 
possibility of a different construction for the Utah Constitution in 
this specific context. 
In State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188 (Utah 1986), the Court 
pointed out that its decision that the falsehood contained in the 
affidavit did not invalidate the search warrant was not dispositive 
of how the issue might be resolved under Article I, §14 of the Utah 
Constitution. The Court acknowledged that "the federal law as it 
has developed since Franks v. Delaware [438 U.S. 154 (1978)] is not 
entirely adequate" and that w[t]here is no stronger argument for 
developing adequate remedies for violation of the state and federal 
constitutional prohibitions on unreasonable searches and seizures 
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than the example of a police officer deliberately lying under oath 
in order to obtain a search warrant." Jj3. at 192-3. Hence, an 
analysis under the Utah Constitution distinct from that in Franks v. 
Delaware is appropriate where misrepresentations are included in an 
affidavit in support of a search warrant or omitted therefrom. 
Furthermore, in Franks, the defendant "conceded that if 
what is left is sufficient to sustain probable cause, the 
inaccuracies are irrelevant" and that if "the warrant affiant had no 
reason to believe the information was false, there was no violation 
of the Fourth Amendment." Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. at 172. 
Hence, the issue of whether an intentional or reckless 
misrepresentation in an affidavit invalidates the search warrant and 
the issue of the effect of a negligent misrepresentation were not 
presented to the high court. 
In addition to Utah case law explicitly suggesting the 
possibility that the Utah search and seizure provision be 
interpreted differently from its federal counterpart, case law from 
other jurisdictions supports the separate analysis advanced by 
Mr. Pyeatt. Mr. Pyeatt's argument essentially was (1) intentional 
misrepresentations should invalidate the warrant and (2) negligent 
misrepresentations should be excised and the affidavit then reviewed 
to determine whether probable cause exists absent the negligent 
misrepresentations. 
Cases decided prior to Franks v. Delaware, such as United 
States v. Hunt, 496 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1974), and United States v. 
Thomas, 489 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1974), held that "[i]f the affiant 
intentionally makes false statements to mislead a judicial officer 
on application for a warrant, these render the warrant invalid 
regardless of whether or not such statements are material to 
establishing probable cause." Such a rationale makes sense since, 
where an officer has intentionally misrepresented some facts in an 
affidavit, the entire affidavit becomes suspect. 
Since Franks, several courts have held that intentional 
misrepresentations in an affidavit invalidate the entire affidavit 
and warrant under a state constitutional analysis. See e.g. 
State v. Malkin, 722 P.2d 943, 946 (Alaska 1986); State v. Caldwell, 
384 So.2d 431 (La. 1980); People v. Cook, 583 P.2d 130 (Cal.. 1978). 
In Cook, the Court noted: 
Contrary to the case of negligent mistakes, 
excision of deliberate falsehoods in an affidavit 
does not leave the remaining allegations 
unaffected and hence presumptively true. The fact 
that the misstatements are intentional injects a 
new element into the analysis, to wit, the 
doctrine that a witness knowingly false in one 
part of his testimony is to be distrusted in the 
whole. 
583 P.2d at 140. 
The Court summed up that "although the court can excise 
the intentionally false allegations it cannot presume the remainder 
not be true. Lacking a reliable factual basis in the affidavit, the 
court has no alternative under settled constitutional principles but 
to quash the warrant and exclude the product of search. [Citations 
omitted.]" I_d. at 141. 
Furthermore, there is case law from other jurisdictions 
supporting Appellant's argument that negligent misrepresentations 
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must be excised and the remaining portions of the affidavit 
considered in determining whether to uphold the warrant. See 
People v. Theodor, 501 P.2d 234 (Cal. 1972} (modified on denial of 
rehg); People v. Cook, 583 P.2d 130 (Cal. 1978). 
Hence, rationale and precedent both exist for deciding 
the issue differently under the Utah Constitution. Appellantfs 
analysis under Article I, §14 is especially compelling since (1) a 
review of the affidavit and Officer Droubay's testimony shows, by 
circumstantial evidence, that Officer Droubay acted intentionally or 
recklessly in putting together the affidavit, which would require 
invalidation of the warrant without further analysis pursuant to 
Appellantfs state constitutional theory, and (2) assuming, arguendo, 
that Officer Droubay did not act intentionally or recklessly, the 
negligence of including obviously false information would require 
excision of that false information and therefore invalidate the 
warrant. 
Mr. Pyeatt respectfully requests that this Court rehear 
this issue and address his state constitutional arguments. 
CONCLUSION 
Because this Court misconstrued and misapplied the facts 
and the law and overlooked relevant precedent and rationale, 
Mr. Pyeatt respectfully requests that this Court reconsider its 
decision in this case and reverse his convictions and remand the 
case for dismissal or a new trial absent the illegally seized 
- 11 -
evidence. 
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ADDENDUM A 
F I L E D 
APR2W989 
IN 1ITIF UTAH rOIJRT OF APPEALS 
——ooOoo 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Steven J Pyeatt, 
Defendant and Appellant. ) 
. Noonan 
[)f t* Court 
Utoft Court of Appeals 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Publication) 
Case No 8802,3 4 CIA 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable Sheila McCleve; The Hon cable Kenneth Rigtrup 
Attorneys: Brooke C. Wells and Joan C. Watt, Salt Lake City, 
for Appellant 
R. Paul Van Dam, Charlene Barlow, and Dan Larsen, 
Salt Lake City, for Respondent 
Before Judges Davidson, Bench, and Orme. 
ORME, Judge: 
In this appeal, defendant raises two related challenges 
to his conviction.1 First, he claims Officer Droubay's 
affidavit fails to allege sufficient facts upon which Judge 
McCleve could base her finding of probable cause to issue the 
search warrant. Second, defendant claims Judge Rigtrup erred 
by denying defendants motion to suppress the cocaine and 
related contraband found during the search of defendant's 
house. We find no error and affirm defendant's conviction. 
We first consider whether Officer Droubay's affidavit in 
support of the search warrant established probable cause to 
search defendant's residence Defendant correctly 
acknowledges 
1. Defendant's third challenge, that the search warrant lacks 
particularity, is without merit. 
the scope of our review, which is limited to determining 
whether Judge McCleve -had a substantial basis to conclude 
that in the totality of the circumstances/ the affidavit 
adequately established probable cause for the issuance of a 
search warrant." State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127/ 129 (Utah 
1987) (per curiam). "Probable cause" in this context "is 
nothing more than a reasonable belief that the evidence sought 
is located at a place indicated by the policeman's 
affidavit." United States v. Dill, 693 F.2d 1012/ 1014 (10th 
Cir. 1982). Moreover/ we give great deference to Judge 
McCleve's determination that probable cause existed for 
issuing the warrant. See, e.g., Hansen, 732 P.2d at 129; 
State v. Miller, 740 P.2d 1363/ 1364 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Defendant claims Droubay's affidavit is an insufficient 
basis for the warrant because it (1) does not establish a 
"fair probability" that cocaine was located at defendant's 
residence/ (2) does not specifically and clearly establish the 
basis for Droubay's attestation to the confidential 
informant's reliability, and (3) is stale due to the length of 
time between the last controlled buy and the issuance of the 
warrant. We find no merit in any of these contentions. On 
the contrary, our review of the affidavit convinces us that 
Judge McCleve "had a substantial basis to conclude that in the 
totality of the circumstances" probable cause existed to issue 
the warrant. 
Droubay's affidavit/ while somewhat inaccurate and 
overstated in certain aspects/ nonetheless establishes a 
pattern of "dealer/broker" drug trafficking. Droubay claims 
that he and his fellow officers arranged two controlled buys 
of cocaine at the Atherton apartment.2 on both occasions, 
the "dealer" left the apartment and was followed by the 
officers to defendant's residence. When the "dealer" returned 
2. While one sentence in the affidavit states that the 
cocaine was obtained from defendant's residence, we fail to 
see how this technically inaccurate representation could have 
misled Judge McCleve/ especially in light of the next thirteen 
paragraphs discussing in detail the two controlled buys. The 
affidavit contains a number of clear statements to the effect 
that the "dealer" actually produced the cocaine at the 
Atherton apartment/ but was believed to have retrieved it from 
defendant's residence. We of course reject the suggestion 
that Judge McCleve may not have carefully read the entire 
affidavit. 
880274-CA 2 
to the Atherton apartment, he delivered cocaine to the 
confidential informant. On one of those occasions, the 
informant received an incriminating telephone call from the 
"dealer* during the time the officers knew the "dealer" was at 
defendant's residence. This sequence of events establishes 
probable cause to believe the "dealer" retrieved the cocaine 
from defendant's residence, and that more cocaine and related 
contraband could be found there. While the officers' 
methodology is certainly not a model for a narcotics officer 
training manual, we cannot say that Judge McCleve erred in 
issuing the warrant. Defendant's specific challenges do not 
change our conclusion. 
First, we are not convinced that Judge McCleve erred 
simply because the affidavit did not specifically allege that 
cocaine had been seen in defendant's residence, nor that the 
"dealer" ever stated he was going to defendant's residence to 
get the drugs. See State v. Hadd, 127 Ariz. 270, 619 P.2d 
1047, 1053 (Ct. App. 1980) (probable cause to search 
"broker's" house was established by an affidavit alleging that 
drugs were found in "dealer's" car immediately after he was 
seen leaving "broker's" house). While such particular 
allegations would certainly be helpful in establishing 
probable cause, defendant cites no authority rendering them 
mandatory. In fact, we think such an inflexible approach is 
inconsistent with the totality of the circumstances standard. 
Second, we do not find it significant that the warrant 
was issued after only two controlled buys, see Hadd, 619 P.2d 
at 1049-50, 1053, or that the last buy possibly took place two 
weeks before the warrant was obtained. See State v. Hansen, 
732 P.2d 127, 131 (Utah 1987). While at least one case 
suggests in dicta that perhaps two trips to the "brokerfsM 
house by the "dealer" during controlled buys would be 
insufficient to establish probable cause, State v. witwer, 642 
P.2d 828, 832 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982), that case was not 
decided under a "totality of the circumstances" standard. We 
decline to adopt the "three-buy minimum" defendant, in effect, 
proposes. Instead, affidavits in support of search warrants 
must be analyzed on a case-by-case basis. The totality of the 
circumstances alleged in Droubay's affidavit, coupled with two 
controlled buys, is sufficient to establish probable cause to 
search defendant's residence. 
Finally, we cannot agree that the warrant was improperly 
issued because much of the information contained in the 
affidavit was relayed to Droubay by a confidential informant, 
880274-CA 3 
or perhaps even by other officers. See State v. Nielsen, 727 
P.2d 188, 192 (Utah 1986) ("The use of hearsay evidence to 
establish probable cause does not necessarily undercut the 
validity of a warrant-"), cert, denied. 480 U.S. 930 (1986). 
Droubay stated that his informant was reliable and based his 
attestation on specific prior experiences with the informant. 
Defendant has not convinced us that Judge McCleve erred in 
concluding Droubay's affidavit demonstrated informant 
reliability. See, e.g., State v. Anderson. 701 P.2d 1099, 
1102 (Utah 1985) (informant's veracity can be established 
through an affidavit stating that the informant has previously 
given reliable information). 
For the foregoing reasons, we hold Judge McCleve did not 
err in issuing the warrant based on Droubay's affidavit. 
Our final inquiry is whether Judge Rigtrup erred in not 
suppressing the evidence. We will affirm this ruling unless 
the factual assessment underlying it is clearly erroneous. 
State v. Ashe. 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987). A trial 
court's factual assessment is not clearly erroneous unless our 
review of the evidence leaves us with a "definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been made." id. (quoting 
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.. 395 U.S. 100, 
123 (1969)). Defendant takes exception to Judge Rigtrup*s 
ruling that Droubay did not act in "bad faith." Implicitly, 
Judge Rigtrup concluded that Droubay did not knowingly, 
intentionally, or recklessly include false statements or omit 
material information in his affidavit. See State v. Slowe, 
728 P.2d 110, 111 (Utah 1985). We are not persuaded that this 
ruling is clearly erroneous. 
Defendant has not presented any compelling evidence that 
Droubay's somewhat inaccurate and incomplete statements were 
made knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly. We find it more 
likely that the misstatements were the result of Droubay's 
confusion, oversight, or ineptitude, not the result of a plan 
to mislead Judge McCleve. In any case, we are not convinced 
that any of the statements defendant claims are false or 
wrongfully omitted would be material to a determination of 
probable cause. See id. at 111 (minor discrepancies in 
affidavit "did not undermine the essential truth of the 
allegations"). The basic facts we hold to establish probable 
cause are essentially undisputed. 
Because we find no precedent or rationale compelling a 
different result under our state constitution, we do not 
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address the issue Accordingly, we affirm defendant's 
conviction. 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
|A|1: ,. 0 N C U R ; 
RiclTSfrcTl^  Davidson, Judge 
Russell W, Bench# Judge 
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